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In a Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status
Offenders Deserve Procedural Due Process
Erin M. Smith*
Between 1986 and 1988, the Rhode Island Family Court ad-
judged Eric Unger "wayward" three times.' Under Rhode Island
law wayward offenses do not constitute criminal wrongdoing and
therefore Unger argued that they were "status offenses."2 The
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section 4A1.2(c)(2)
* B.A. 1990, University of St. Thomas; J.D. 1993, University of Minnesota Law
School
1. United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759,762 (1st Cir. 1990) cert denied, 111
S.Ct. 1005 (1991). Rhode Island law defines wayward as follows:
14-1-3. Definitions.
(G) The term "wayward" when applied to a child shall mean and in-
clude any child -
(1) Who has deserted his or her home without good or sufficient
cause; or
(2) Who habitually associates with dissolute, vicious or immoral
persons; or
(3) Who is leading an immoral or vicious life; or
(4) Who is habitually disobedient to the reasonable and lawful
commands of his or her parent or parents, guardian or other lawful
custodian; or
(5) Who, being required by chapter 19 of title 16 to attend school,
wilfully and habitually absents himself therefrom, or habitually vio-
lates rules and regulations of the school when he or she attends; or
(6) Who has on any occasion violated any of the laws of the state
or of the United States or any of the ordinances of cities and towns,
other than ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-3 (Supp. 1991).
2. Unger, 915 F.2d at 762. See R.I.GEN.LAwS § 14-1-40 (1981 & Supp.1989).
Kim Brooks, Noncriminal Offendems An Enigma to the Juvenile Justice System,
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 14, 16 (state statutes vary as to what constitutes status
offenses but the most common behaviors include truancy, curfew violations, run-
ning away from home, and incorrigibility); H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: PoL-
IcY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 57 (1985) (many states relabel noncriminal status
offenders as CHINS or PINS (children/persons in need of supervision)); JOHN L.
HUTZLER, JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION OVER CHILDREN'S CONDUCT: 1982 COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE & FAMILY CODES AND NATIONAL STANDARDS, 2
(1982) (42 states and the District of Columbia have separate categories for children
who commit behavior that would not be criminal if they were an adult; the other
eight states include this behavior under a delinquency, unlabeled or general juris-
diction category).
Status offenses differ from adjudications of delinquency. Children found guilty
of delinquency have committed acts which would be criminal by adult standards.
An example is the Rhode Island law which defined delinquent as follows:
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provide that "status offenses" should not be considered when cal-
culating a defendant's adult criminal history score.3 Despite the
clear mandate of section 4A1.2(c)(2), when Unger was convicted as
an adult two years later these juvenile wayward judgments were
used to increase his criminal history score and subject him to the
maximum sentence. 4
In taking these status offenses into account, the First Circuit
14-1-3. Definitions.-
(F) The term "delinquent" when applied to a child shall mean and in-
clude any child-
Who has committed any offense which, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a felony, or who has on more than one occasion vio-
lated any of the other laws of the state or of the United States or any
of the ordinances of cities and towns, other than ordinances relating to
the operation of motor vehicles.
R.I.GEN. LAws § 14-1-3 (Supp. 1991).
3. The pertinent part of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) reads:
... Sentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted [in compiling an of-
fender's criminal history score], except as follows:
(1) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to
them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the
sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of im-
prisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar
to an instant offense:
Contempt of court
Disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace
Driving without a license or with a revoked or suspended license
False information to a police officer
Fish and game violations
Gambling
Hindering or failure to obey a police officer






(2) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them,
by whatever name they are known, are never counted:
Hitchhiking





U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(2)(1989). Since November 1987, when a defendant is convicted in a
federal court, the sentencing judge must impose a sentence based on the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1A2 (1989). The court determines the de-
fendants criminal history score by taking into account prior offenses. A defendant
with a higher criminal history score will receive a more severe sentence under the
Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (1989). For an analysis of the constitutional problems
raised when juvenile sentences are used in a defendant's criminal history score to
enhance later adult sentences see, David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult An
Examination of the Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to En-
hance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1769 (1991).
4. Unger, 915 F.2d at 760.
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Court of Appeals held that when determining whether an offense
was a "status offense" the court should "look to the substance of
the underlying state offense" rather than the particular offense of
which the juvenile was convicted.5 For example, Unger allegedly
engaged in a variety of criminal conduct as a juvenile, including
breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods and assault and bat-
tery.6 This conduct, however, could not be proved and therefore
Unger was not convicted of any of these criminal offenses but was
instead found "guilty" of being "wayward." Nonetheless, in look-
ing to the substance of the offense, the First Circuit determined
that Unger's alleged youthful conduct in no way constituted status
offense behavior.7 Consequently, the First Circuit ultimately in-
cluded Unger's three wayward convictions in calculating his crimi-
nal history score as an adult under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.8 The Unger case illustrates that finding a child guilty
of status offense behavior can ultimately have serious repercus-
sions at the time of an adult conviction.
In addition to affecting a defendant's adult sentencing, an-
other danger of a status offense is that it can easily lead to a more
severe juvenile criminal conviction. Once status offenders are in
the juvenile court system, they can more easily be deemed delin-
quents.9 A court, for example, may conclude the child is a delin-
5. Id, at 763.
6. 1I
7. 1& The court noted that:
Under no stretch of the imagination can these malefactions be consid-
ered 'status offenses' like, say, hitchhiking, truancy, loitering, or va-
grancy. Nor can the fact that the Rhode Island Family Court adjudged
the defendant 'wayward' in response to this behavior transmogrify his
wrongful acts into status offenses for purposes of the sentencing
guidelines.
See also, United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 251, 253-254 (9th Cir. 1990) (offenses
listed in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) are excluded from defendant's criminal history be-
cause they are of minor significance to goals of sentencing).
8. Unger was included in Criminal History Category number V with a total of
10 points. The sentencing table for an offense level of 15 and a Criminal History
Category of V has a range of imprisonment of 37-46 months. Unger was sentenced
to the peak of the applicable range. 915 F.2d at 760; U.S.S.G. ch. 5, Part A. (1991)
(Sentencing Table). However, had Unger's argument that the criminal history
points assessed for his status offenses violated the Guidelines § 4A1.2(c)(2) pre-
vailed, he would have been included in Criminal History Category III with a sen-
tencing range of 24-30 months. Id Consequently, Unger's three juvenile status
offense adjudications increased his sentence by at least seven months of imprison-
ment [37-30 (the lowest sentence in Category V minus the highest sentence in Cate-
gory III)].
9. H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW, 58 (2d.ed.
1985) (Description of differences between status offenders and delinquents.) Status
offenders commit offenses which would not be considered criminal if the offense
were committed by an adult. Juvenile delinquents are guilty of behavior which
would be considered a crime if committed by an adult. See also, Steven H.Clarke,
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quent for violating the court orders of her status offender
sentence. Similarly, a court may find the status offender in con-
tempt of court, allowing for secure confinement.' 0 All these possi-
ble repercussions of a status offense conviction demand scrutiny of
the procedural rights available at the underlying status
adjudication.
This article examines adjudications of status offenders, and
the serious consequences of these adjudications for juveniles. Part
I examines the procedural protections that juvenile status offend-
ers receive. This section focuses on the disparity between the pro-
cedural protections juvenile delinquents receive in comparison to
status offenders and the philosophy purportedly justifying this dis-
parity. Part II analyzes bootstrapping and contempt of court pro-
ceedings that increase the severity of status offenders
dispositions. 11 Finally, this article concludes that because status
offense adjudications can result in deprivations of liberty through
home removal dispositions or secure confinement of the juvenile
and increased sentences of the juvenile as an adult, there is no jus-
tification for denying these noncriminal offenders the procedural
protections afforded both adults and juvenile delinquents.
I. Procedural Protections and the Juvenile Court
A. In re Gault and its Progeny
The juvenile court differs from the adult court system in
Status Offenders Are Different: A Comparison of Offender Careers By Type of First
Known Offense, 12 J. REs. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 51 (1975) (concluding that efforts
should focus on delinquents because they are more likely to recidivate); But See,
Charles W. Thomas, Are Status Offenders Really So Different?, 22 CRIME & DE-
LiNq. 438 (1976) (concluding that status offenders are not so different since they re-
offend at the same rate as delinquents).
10. Facilities for placement of children are normally defined by the level of se-
curement. See e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.015: a
Subd. 16. "Secure detention facility" means a physically restricting fa-
cility, including but not limited to a jail, a hospital, a state institution,
a residential treatment center, or a detention home used for the tem-
porary care of a child pending court action.
Subd. 17. "Shelter care Facility" means a physically unrestricting fa-
cility, such as but not limited to, a hospital, a group home or a licensed
facility for foster care, used for the temporary care of a child pending
court action (1990);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-22 (West 1987):
c. "Detention" means the temporary care of juvenile in physically re-
stricting facilities pending court disposition.
d. "Shelter care" means the temporary care of juveniles in facilities
without physical restriction pending court disposition Id.
11. See RUBIN, supra note 9 at 68 (bootstrapping in this context, is the term
given to the practice of reclassifying a status offender as a delinquent for violating
the terms of her sentence).
[Vol. 10:253
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many respects. One significant difference is that the juvenile court
has not followed the traditional practices of adult criminal due
process. The Supreme Court criticized the denial of traditional
due process protections in the seminal decision In re Gault,12
which finally extended some procedural protections to juvenile
delinquents.
The Supreme Court recognizes that the juvenile court system
differs from the adult court system in both conception and prac-
tice.' 3 The juvenile court developed with the intention of provid-
ing child offenders rehabilitation and treatment, rather than
focusing on the punishment of offenders.14 The overarching goal
of this "treatment approach" is to act in the "best interests" of the
child.15 The common law justification for intervention and treat-
ment was the parens patriae doctrine - the right of the state to
take control of children whose parents were unable or unwilling to
meet their responsibilities or of children who pose a threat to the
community.16
Another major difference between the two court systems is
that juvenile courts do not deal solely with criminal offenders.17
The doctrine of parens patriae allowed courts to assert control
over criminal and noncriminal conduct of juveniles. Noncriminal
behavior over which the courts exercise jurisdiction can include
truancy, running away, smoking, sexual activity, or living a way-
ward, idle, and dissolute life.' 8 These behaviors are generally cate-
gorized as "status offenses." It is the status of being a child
combined with the misbehavior that allows the juvenile courts to
intervene.19 In general, a status offender's behavior is unaccept-
able by societal standards but would not constitute criminal con-
duct if committed by an adult.
Historically when adjudicating status offenders and juvenile
criminal offenders, juvenile courts did not follow traditional no-
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. Id. 14-19; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
14. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 148-151 (1984).
15. Id. at 150.
16. Id. at 148.
17. Id. at 148-49.
18. See RuBrN, supra note 9, at 56. See also FRANCIS BARRY MCCARTHY &
JAMES CARR, JUVENILE LAw AND rrs PROCESSES 171 (1989) (relating the Task Force
on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention efforts to reduce the use of vague
labels governing status jurisdiction); Brooks, supra note 2, at 16 (attacks on vague-
ness of status offense jurisdiction that have failed are indicative of the sustencance
of the parens patriae doctrine).
19. See Rubin, supra note 9 at 51.
1992]
Law and Inequality
tions of adult criminal due process.20 In order to meet the "best
interests" of the child, intervention was to be informal and individ-
ualized.2 1 Unfortunately, this discretionary process left juveniles
to suffer from "the worst of both worlds."2 2 Juveniles received
"neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children."23
The Supreme Court's groundbreaking 1967 decision, In re
Gault 24 squarely addressed the apparent failings of the traditional
juvenile justice system. Gault acknowledged that the justifications
for denying juveniles procedural protections no longer reflected
reality, because juveniles received punishment like adults rather
than treatment and rehabilitation.25 The Court concluded that
children should at the very least receive some procedural protec-
tions. Therefore, the Court extended the rights of notice, assist-
ance of counsel, a privilege against self incrimination, and
opportunity to confront and cross examine witnesses.2 Gault ex-
pressly limited its holding to the adjudicatory hearing for a child
determined to be a delinquent, i.e., those charged with a crime and
facing institutional confinement.2 7 Consequently, the procedural
rights of status offenders were left for the state courts to
determine.
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the procedural
protections for juveniles first recognized in Gault. In In re Win-
ship, the Court held that juvenile criminal conduct must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.28 Consistent with the limitation im-
posed in Gault, this evidentiary standard also extended to the ad-
20. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
21. The modern juvenile court, however, increasingly focuses on the offense
committed rather than the individual offender. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile
Court Meets The Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference
it Makes, 68 B.U.L.REv. 821, 821 (1988).
22. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
23. I&
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. The Supreme Court noted:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiv-
ing home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of con-
finement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.
His world becomes 'a building with whitewashed walls, regimented
routine, and institutional hours....' Instead of mother and father and
sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled
by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents' confined with
him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 31-57.
27. Id. at 13.
28. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
(Vol. 10:253
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judication of delinquency only.29 Similarly, the Court later applied
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to delin-
quency proceedings.30 Although Gault and Winship were mile-
stones on the road to affording greater protection, status offenders
continued to suffer from the "worst of both worlds."31 The major-
ity of status offenders enjoyed few procedural protections, and the
goal of fulfilling the child's "best interests" remained an empty
promise.
B. State Protections for Status Offenders.
Left to their discretion, most state courts have refused to
grant status offenders the same procedural protections guaranteed
delinquents by the Supreme Court. Perceived differences between
delinquents and status offenders underlie the denial of the right
against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard. Compounding many courts'
mistaken reliance on labeling, is the misguided belief that status
offenders are being reformed and thus can be denied procedural
protections. Since these children are not simply being treated and
rehabilitated this justification is not tenable and should no longer
be followed.
Since status offenders were not included in the holdings of In
29. The Court noted that: "[t]his case presents the single, narrow question
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process
and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." 397
U.S. at 359 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30). Note one of the Winship opinion
clearly states that "we intimate no view concerning the constitutionality of the New
York procedures governing children in need of supervision." Id. at n.1.
30. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Breed held that the double jeopardy
clause prevented adult prosecution after a conviction in juvenile court for the same
offense. Id. at 541. Although Breed did not mandate double jeopardy for status of-
fenders, a litigated case in Illinois did extend this right to juveniles in Illinois. In re
R.L.K finds that a strict dichotomy either between minors in need of supervision
(MINS) and delinquent proceedings is not realistic or in the child's interest. 384
N.E.2d 531, 534 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978). The court found that because the dispositions
available to MINS and delinquents are substantially similar and because both pro-
ceedings can stigmatize the child that double jeopardy should be applied to MINS
children. Id at 534.
31. See Feld, supra note 14, at 168. Juvenile delinquents are also left with the
worst of both worlds since the protections afforded juveniles are less adequate than
those afforded adults. For example, not all procedural protections were extended
to juvenile delinquents. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.528 (1971). McKeiver
held that a jury trial is not required in a juvenile adjudication. Furthermore, real-
ity shows that juvenile delinquents are not necessarily receiving the constitutional
protections that Gault provided. See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juve-
nile Courts: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They
Make, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989) (less than fifty percent of juvenile
adjudicated delinquent receive assistance from counsel).
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re Gault or In re Winship, state courts have developed inconsis-
tent ways of dealing with status offenders.32 Generally, the theory
of parens patriae is still prevalent and constitutes the primary ba-
sis for allowing status offenders fewer procedural protections.
Simply put, the theory is that since these children did not commit
crimes, the court's role is not to punish but to treat.3 3 Therefore,
juvenile courts do not recognize due process protections as neces-
sary or desirable. What the courts fail to realize is that once proce-
dural protections are eliminated, the goals of accurate fact finding
and prevention of governmental oppression are effectively aban-
doned.34 Although courts attempt to justify the denial of proce-
dural protections by stating that these children receive less
punitive dispositions, the courts' treatment of status offenders is
not solely rehabilitative since committing noncriminal behavior
twice can ultimately provide the basis for incarceration. 35 Fur-
thermore, any home removal of the juvenile is a deprivation of the
juvenile's liberty interest.
The inequality between protections afforded juvenile delin-
quents and status offenders is manifest in the denial of the right
against self-incrimination. The Maryland case of In re Cindy Ann
Spalding epitomizes the dominant view of denying the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination to non-criminal of-
fenders.36 The Spalding court employed the two pronged test out-
32. The various state approaches produces a patchwork of case law on status of-
fenses. This patchwork is especially eclectic because the amount of case law on sta-
tus offenders is relatively undeveloped. There is not much law on the subject due
to the fact that so few children receive lawyers and without laywers to raise cases
for appeal, the area of law cannot develop and instead remains a patchwork of in-
consistencies. See Feld, supra note 31. This article analyzes the variation of rates
of representation of juvenile delinquents and status offenders in Minnesota. Table
three reveals that children who commit more serious offenses receive higher rates
of representation, than children who commit status offenses. Id at 1220-1223.
33. See Feld, supra note 14, at 141, 148-150.
34. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-364 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
35. See infra part II.A-B.
36. 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975). See FRANCIS B. McCARTHY & JAMES G. CARR, JU-
VENILE LAW AND ITs PRocEssEs 356 (1989); FRANK W. MILLER ET AL, THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE PROCESs 526 (2nd ed. 1976). State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa
1972), also thoroughly analyzes whether children who do not commit criminal acts
deserve the extension of the right against self incrimination. The Henderson court
specifically states:
[W]here there is no public offense charged we believe the require-
ment of advising the juvenile and his parents of this right to remain
silent would frustrate the very purpose of the juvenile proceeding.
Admittedly, upon the findings of the trial court the child may have to
spend some time away from his home but such time will not be spent
in a completely institutionalized setting. The record establishes visita-
tion rights are lenient, and that the average stay for a child at the
Home is about one year.
Id. at 119.
[Vol. 10:253
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lined in Gault to determine whether the constitutional right
against self-incrimination was due. According to Gault, the pro-
ceeding must 1) be to adjudicate delinquent criminal conduct; and
2) the delinquency must be such that it could result in commit-
ment to a state institution.37 The Maryland Department of Juve-
nile Services initially charged Cindy Spalding as both a
"delinquent child" and as a "child in need of supervision."3 8 How-
ever, the Spalding court determined that she was, in fact, a victim
of all the events that had occurred; consequently the charge of de-
linquency was "an unexplained anomaly." 39 The court concluded
that being a victim did not constitute a crime and therefore found
the privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to the
proceedings.
The language of the Supreme Court in Gault supports ex-
tending the right of self-incrimination. The Gault court stated
that "it would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-in-
crimination were available to hardened criminals but not to chil-
dren."40 The Spalding court, however, denied the right because it
The dissent in Henderson strongly disagrees with the holding, finding it unfair to
give some children more rights than others. Id. at 123.
37. Spalding, 332 A.2d at 252. The Spalding court cites the Gault court's hold-
ing that a "juvenile proceeding to determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to com-
mitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the
privilege against self incrimination." Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
38. The court noted that:
These allegations are 'that the respondent had... engaged in acts of sexual inter-
course and sexual perversion with an unknown number of male and female adults
for a period of more than one year. The respondent is ungovernable and beyond
the control of her parent, deports herself in a manner as to be a danger to herself
and others and is in need of care and treatment.'
332 A.2d at 248n.2.
Maryland statutory law defines these terms as follows:
§ 3-801. Definitions.
(f) Child in need of supervision. - 'Child in need of supervision' is a
child who requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation and
(1) He is required by law to attend school and is habitually truant;
or
(2) He is habitually disobedient, ungovernable, and beyond the
control of the person having custody of him; or
(3) He deports himself so as to injure or endanger himself or
others; or
(4) He has committed an offense applicable only to children.
(k) Delinquent act. - 'Delinquent act' means an act which would be a
crime if committed by an adult.
(1) Delinquent child. - 'Delinquent child' is a child who has committed
a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1989).
39. 332 A.2d at 256. Maryland defines victim as follows:
(s) Victim. - (1)"Victim" means a person who suffers direct or threatened physical,
emotional, or financial harm as a result of a delinquent act.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1989).
40. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
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believed the category Children in Need of Supervision (CINS) was
established "to insure that treatment of children guilty of miscon-
duct peculiarly reflecting the propensities and susceptibilities of
youth, will acquire none of the institutional, quasi-penal features
of treatment. .. "41 According to this reasoning, providing Fifth
Amendment rights would establish a penal atmosphere to the det-
riment of these non-criminal offenders. Gault struck down this
same rationale for denying procedural protections to delinquents.
42
Gault held that "the absence of procedural rules based upon con-
stitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and ef-
fective procedures."43  Rather "[d]epartures from established
principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlight-
ened procedure, but in arbitrariness." 44 Gault also noted that the
label given the proceeding should not determine whether the priv-
ilege is extended.45 Instead, "the nature of the statement or ad-
mission and the exposure it invites" should be the deciding
factors.46 Since status offenders are "exposed" to the possibility of
institutionalization, which is no more rehabilitative than the insti-
tutionalization of delinquents, they deserve the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. 47 Furthermore, any home removal is a depri-
vation of liberty which should provide a basis for the extension of
the right against self-incrimination. 48
41. 332 A.2d 246, 251 citing to the Court of Special Appeals decision, 318 A.2d at
281.
42. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. In discussing the creation of the juvenile court Jus-
tice Fortas explains:
The child-essentially good, as they saw it-was to be made 'to
feel that he is the object of (the state's) care and solicitude,' not that
he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were
therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicali-
ties, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and proce-
dural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime
and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be 'treated'
and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through in-
stitutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive. Id.
43. 387 U.S. at 18.
44. I&
45. 387 U.S. at 49.
46. I&
47. Although Spalding was ultimately placed in a foster home, the majority ad-
mits that Maryland's current statutory law would have permitted detention of
Spalding and other Children in Need of Supervision. In re Spalding, 332 A.2d 246,
256. Current Maryland statutes say children in need of supervision may not be
placed in secure facilities. See, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815 (e) (1989)
(dispositions available to a child in need of supervision can still effect their liberty,
as they may be placed in a private home or shelter care facility). Id. at (e)(iii).
48. The Gault court stated:
And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "com-
pelled" to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with
deprivation of his liberty - a command which this Court has broadly
(Vol. 10:253
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Delinquency was not being adjudicated in Spalding. Conse-
quently, the court determined that it need not consider whether
the second prong of the Gault test was met, and, as a result, the
possible denial of the juveniles' liberty interest was left unad-
dressed.49 Gault recognized that "commitment is a deprivation of
liberty.., it is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called
'criminal' or 'civil.' 50 However, this liberty interest is not
unqualified.
In Schall v. Martin, the Court concluded that a "juvenile's
liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated
to the State's 'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting
the welfare of the child.' "51 Spalding could have been placed in a
secure facility,52 and although recognizing the Supreme Court's
previous acknowledgment in Gault that secure confinement does
not promote the welfare of children, the Spalding court neverthe-
less took a narrow approach to Spalding's liberty interest when it
upheld the actions of the trial court in compelling her to take the
witness stand and testify against herself.53 Furthermore, place-
ment in a foster home is also a deprivation of liberty under Gault
since it is forced living for a period away from ones' own home and
applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching
of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle
for freedom.
387 U.S. at 50.
49. 332 A.2d at 256. Cindy argued that at her hearing the possibility for com-
mitment to a state institution existed, along with confinement with juvenile delin-
quents. Furthermore, she notes that she is now "one step closer" to imprisonment.
An issue made clear in Part II of this note. Despite the Spalding court's recogni-
tion that there is "much to commend these arguments" the court refused to address
whether potential confinement would mandate application of the Fifth Amend-
ment right to self incrimination.
50. 387 U.S. at 50.
51. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). In Schall, Justice Rehnquist acknowledges that juveniles do
have a liberty interest, yet this interest he finds "must be qualified by the recogni-
tion that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." 467 U.S. at
265.
52. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
53. 332 A.2d 246, 249. The dissent explains the sequence of events compelling
Cindy to testify against herself:
Mr. Newell (prosecuting attorney): I call Cindy Ann Spalding to the
stand.
Mr. Meola (petitioner's attorney); Objection
The Court: Well-
Mr. Meola: I instruct my witness not to testify at all. She may be-
The Court: All right, take the stand, Cindy, step up to the stand. All
right you will be sworn first.'
Petitioner was then examined extensively by the trial judge and
the prosecuting attorney. Objections made by her attorney to incrimi-
nating questions were ignored or overruled.
Id. at 260 (dissenting opinion).
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family.54 Unfortunately, the Spalding court ignored the fact that
the dispositions available to Spalding were such an infringement
on her liberty as to warrant the Fifth Amendment protection.
Thorough analysis of the available dispositions reveals that this sit-
uation necessitates a Gault extension of the right against self-
incrimination.55
In denying Spalding procedural protections, the Spalding
court mistakenly relied on labels. The dissent correctly noted the
detrimental effect a decision such as Spalding could have on the
constitutional rights of children labeled by something other than
delinquent.56 Although the acts Spalding committed would be
criminal acts if committed by an adult, the court labeled her a
"victim" and a "child in need of supervision. "57 The court relied
on these two labels to distinguish her from a delinquent and to
deny her her constitutional rights. As the dissent explained, these
labels should not be determinative of the application of constitu-
tional protections, since a court could adjudicate a child who com-
mitted criminal acts as a "child in need of supervision" or label a
child who committed any criminal activity with an adult as a vic-
tim. 8 Thus, under both examples, the arbitrary label not the ac-
tual behavior, allows denial of the rights Gault mandated.
Several courts agree that Gault and its progeny do not re-
quire courts to provide the same spectrum of rights to juveniles
who are not subjected to the possibility of incarceration.5 9 In the
Oregon case, In re K, although some alternatives for K's disposi-
tion included a foster home or child care center, the court did not
believe these would place any more restrictions on K than a nor-
mal home and thus he was not entitled to the rights of Gault and
Winship.60 Specifically, In re K held that preponderance of the
54. 332 A.2d 246, 259 (dissenting opinion citing to Gault, 387 U.S. at 36).
55. Id. at 259 (dissenting opinion citing Gault 387 U.S. at 36).
56. Id. 257-260.
57. Id. at 258. Both acts of using "controlled and prohibited narcotics" and en-
gaging in "acts of.. .sexual perversion" are criminal acts under Maryland law. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 276 et seq.(1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1991).
58. This is an example of the discretion courts have in deciding with what to
charge a juvenile. With a lower standard of proof and high likelihood the child will
not have counsel a court may charge a child with status behavior, and thus finding
a juvenile guilty is much easier. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Ju-
venile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 699 (1991).
59. In re K., 554 P.2d 180, 183 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). See also, State v. Gillard, 528
S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1975) (preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof for
juvenile probation revocation hearings); State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa
1972) (clear and convincing standard of proof for uncontrolled child); In re Faith
Potter, 237 N.W.2d 461 (Iowa 1976).
60. 554 P.2d at 183.
While any of these alternatives would theoretically have resulted in
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evidence is the standard applicable to adjudications of non-crimi-
nal offenders who do not face the threat of incarceration.8 1
Courts rely on perceived differences between delinquents and
status offenders to justify a different standard of proof. One basis
for denying non-criminal children "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" rests on the principle that the proceeding adjudicates be-
havior that is injurious to the offender or others but not to soci-
ety.6 2 According to this rationale, if courts are serious about
helping these children, a more relaxed standard of proof will allow
more courts to find children "guilty" of status offense behavior
and ultimately help these children. Conversely, if the standard of
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be more difficult for the
state to prove its case and in theory the child will leave the juve-
nile court system without receiving any rehabilitation, treatment,
or help. This rationale is faulty considering that both the Supreme
Court and the majority of commentators have recognized the in-
ability of juvenile institutions to treat and rehabilitate these chil-
dren.63 Courts also rely on the wide range of available dispositions
in denying proof beyond a reasonable doubt.64 Although non-crim-
inal children may initially receive less punitive dispositions for
running away the first time, juvenile courts may later place them
in secure confinement for running away a second time. This has
not led courts to provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
although the first adjudication made the possibility of secure con-
finement real.
In Wagstaff v. Superior Ct., the possibility of detention in a
the imposition of some limitations upon K's personal 'liberty,' none
would have produced a 'deprivation' equivalent in kind or degree to
that necessarily resulting from placement in MacLaren or any other
,camp' or 'program' maintained for the confinement and rehabilitation
of youths requiring secure custody.
61. Id.
62. In re Potter, 237 N.W.2d 461 (Iowa 1976).
63. Gault 387 U.S. at 17-30; Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-366 (1970) See also infra
note 160.
64. State statutes approach the disposition of juveniles in different ways. Some
States like Minnesota lay out extensive lists of possible dispositions for children in
need of supervision and delinquents. MINN. STAT. § 260.191, 260.185 (1990). See also
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080. (1990). Other states state a general purpose for deciding
on a disposition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1989).
Even in the extensive lists available under Minnesota law the dispositions
available to delinquents and status offenders are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. The Minnesota Court of Appeals heard a status offender argue that he should
not be placed in a House Work Program because delinquents are also placed there
and it is "much like a military boot camp". Although the court said they were not
insensitive to this problem, the solution must rest with the legislature since there is
no statutory requirement for separation of the two categories of juveniles. In re
L.J.C., 367 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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child in need of supervision (CINS) proceeding led the Supreme
Court of Alaska to award express due process protection by al-
lowing the child the right to choose an attorney.65 Alaska is one
state in which the legislature gave the right to counsel to all
juveniles. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed its application to
juveniles deemed CINS.6 The juvenile in Wagstaff contacted her
own attorney and the attorney informed the court that he wished
to represent her.6 7 However, the court master denied the request
and concluded it was the court's duty to assign the juvenile coun-
sel.68 On appeal, the court held that juveniles may retain counsel
of their choice.6 9 Furthermore, when the child and parent's inter-
ests are in direct conflict, the juvenile's choice of counsel in a
"child in need of supervision" proceeding must be respected.7 0
Many states have statutes like Alaska's extending the right of
counsel to all children whose dealings with the juvenile court
reach the adjudication stage,71 however, actual representation is
rare.72 Unfortunately, the high degree of consideration given to
the child's rights and interests in Wagstaff is the exception not the
rule. Recent studies of representation in juvenile courts report
that although states may extend the right of counsel to status of-
fenders, these children are represented by an attorney less often
than those accused of delinquent acts.73 There are several possible
explanations for this disparity. One is that judges are more likely
65. 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975).
66. Id. Alaska extends the right of counsel to children in need of supervision
(now labeled "children in need of aid"). ALASKA CT. RuLEs, CHILD IN NEED OF AID
RuLEs, 12, Right to Counsel (Supp. 1992).
67. Wagstaff, 535 P.2d at 1222.
68. The attorney for the state argued "that the juvenile did not have a right to
an attorney in a 'child in need of supervision' proceeding, and to allow one in a non-
delinquency 'family problem' would be contrary to the beneficent purposes of the
family court." Id. at 1223. The master did not accept this argument because the ju-
venile did face possible detention, although he concluded the parents should be able
to choose the attorney. Id,
69. Id. at 1227.
70. I&
71. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 68. See, e.g., ALASKA CT. RULES, CHILD IN NEED
OF AID RuLEs, 12 (1992); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-821 (1989); MINN.
STAT. § 260.155 subd. 2. (1990).
72. See infra note 73.
73. See Barry C. Feld, "In re Gault Revisited& A Cross-State Comparison of the
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 404 (1988) (table three
reveals that in California, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota the percentage
of status offenders receiving counsel is less than the overall percentage of juvenile
offenders in each state receiving counsel); see also Feld, supra note 31 (study of
how two decades after Gault the promise of counsel to juveniles is largely unreal-
ized); Table three reveals that status offenders in Minnesota receive counsel 28.9
percent of the time, whereas the overall percentage of counsel at the adjudication
stage is 45.3 percent. Id at 1220.
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to advise a juvenile of his or her right to counsel if it involves a
felony charge as opposed to a minor offense.74 Also, since parents
and teachers often refer status offenders to the juvenile court,
these persons are usually less interested in protecting the constitu-
tional rights of the child and more interested in allowing the court
discretion to "'do something' with the troublesome child."75
Although the Alaska Supreme Court in Wagstqff recognized
the importance of counsel in a Child in Need of Protection (CHIP)
proceeding that could ultimately lead to confinement, other juris-
dictions have not been as sensitive to the child's due process
rights.76 In re Walker analyzed many arguments surrounding the
74. Chris E. Marshall, et al., The Implementation Of Formal Procedures In Ju-
venile Court Processing Of Status Offenders, 11 J. CRiM. JuST. 195, 197 (1983) (it is
easier for a judge to handle a case without counsel if she has already decided
against incarceration as a possible disposition).
75. Id. Compared to the status offender's position, the delinquent is normally
brought to the court by a police officer. Id. Parents are then less likely to waive
the right to legal representation for the child. Id.
There are a variety of actions the court may take as it attempts to "do some-
thing". Available dispositions for truants and runaways in Minnesota under the
state's statutory law include:
(1) counsel the child or the child's parents, guardian, or custodian;
(2) place the child under the supervision of a probation officer or
other suitable person in the child's own home under conditions pre-
scribed by the court, including reasonable rules for the child's conduct
and the conduct of the parents, guardian, or custodian, designed for
the physical, mental, and moral well-being and behavior of the child;
or with the consent of the commissioner of corrections, place the child
in a group foster care facility which is under the commissioner's man-
agement and supervision;
(3) subject to the court's supervision, transfer legal custody of the
child to one of the following-
(i) a reputable person of good moral character. No person may re-
ceive custody of two or more unrelated children unless licensed to op-
erate a residential program under sections 245A.01 to 245A.16; or
(ii) a county probation officer for placement in a group foster
home established under the direction of the juvenile court and li-
censed pursuant to section 241.021;
(4) require the child to pay a fine of up to $100. The court shall order
payment of the fine in a manner that will not impose undue financial
hardship upon the child;
(5) require the child to participate in a community service project;
(6) order the child to undergo a chemical dependency evaluation and,
if warranted by the evaluation, order participation by the child in a
drug awareness program or an inpatient or outpatient chemical depen-
dency treatment program;
(7) if the court believes that it is in the best interests of the child and
of the public safety that the child's driver's license be canceled, the
court may recommend to the commissioner of public safety that the
child's license be canceled for any period up to the child's 18th
birthday...
(8) require the child to perform any other activities or participate in
any other treatment programs deemed appropriate by the court.
MINN. STAT. § 260.191 subd.1 (b)(1)-(8) (1990).
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Children are not only denied
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counsel issue and ultimately held against providing procedural pro-
tections to status offenders.77 The Walker case dealt with a fifteen
year old girl, Valerie Walker, whom the juvenile court found was
"an undisciplined child and in need of the discipline and supervi-
sion of the State," because she was "regularly disobedient to her
parents in that she goes and comes without permission, keeps late
hours, associates with persons that [her] parents object to, and goes
to places where her parents tell her not to go."7 8 The court placed
Walker on probation with the conditions that she obey her mother
and attend school. 79 She violated terms of her probation and on
this basis the court determined she was a delinquent and commit-
ted her to the North Carolina Board of Juvenile Corrections.8 0
On appeal, the two main arguments for providing counsel to a
non-criminal offender such as Walker failed. One contention was
that counsel should have been present at the first hearing that de-
termined Walker was an undisciplined child.81 The court found
she lacked a right to counsel since, as an undisciplined child, she
could not be incarcerated in a juvenile detention center.8 2 Sec-
ondly, Walker argued that despite the narrow holding of Gault, a
right to counsel should be recognized since a violation of probation
means the child is delinquent and subject to commitment. This ar-
gument failed because the court found the original adjudication
not to be a criminal prosecution under the Sixth Amendment.8 3
counsel in their status offense adjudications but also in home placement revocation
hearings. In Gillard v. Cook, 528 S.W. 2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1975), the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that although a home placement revocation hearing lead to
imprisonment of the juvenile he has no right to counsel. The court went on to say
that although there was no right to counsel, "as a general rule [it] should be pro-
vided.. .[and] any doubt should be resolved in favor of appointment of counsel." Id
at 548.
77. In re Valerie Lenise Walker, 191 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. 1972).
78. Id. at 704.
79. Valerie's terms of probation included:
1. That she be of good behavior and conduct herself in a law abiding
manner;
2. That she mind and obey her parents and not leave home without
permission and then to go only to places that she has permission to
go and return as directed;
3. That she attend school regularly during the school year and obey
the school rules and regulations;
4. That she report to the court counselor as directed, truthfully an-
swer questions put to her concerning her conduct, behavior, associ-
ates and activities and carry out requests given her concerning such.
Id. at 705.
80. Id. The court determined she was a delinquent because she violated condi-
tions No. 1,2, and 3 of her probation terms.
81. Id. at 707.
82. Id. at 708.
83. Id. at 709. (Stating that the initial adjudication finding a juvenile undis-
ciplined is incidental to any later petitions.)
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The Walker case illustrates that even though a conviction of a sta-
tus offense may ultimately effect later adult adjudications and may
place the child at risk of being incarcerated for violating the terms
of her conviction, courts still refuse to recognize a right to counsel
for this group of juveniles. The serious ramifications of a convic-
tion should demand that a status offender receive the right to
counsel.
Courts rely on the differences between adults and juveniles
as justification for the denial of procedural protections, although
the available penalties are similar.8 4 Walker argued that the risk
of incarceration violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the child has committed no criminal
offense and courts subject adults to probation and incarceration for
actual criminal offenses only.8 5 The Walker court based its deci-
sion on "many valid distinctions" between adults and juveniles.8 6
The Court concluded that these differences are "to provide chil-
dren the needed supervision and control."8 7
Once again the Walker court relied upon an erroneous label
to justify the denial of constitutional protections. Walker argued
that a North Carolina statutory law violated the Equal Protection
Clause since it required counsel for children being adjudicated "de-
linquent" but not for children adjudged "undisciplined."8 8 The
court acknowledged that these two categories of children were
treated differently, but it justified the inequality on two bases.
First, state legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power, despite the fact that some inequality exists.8 9
Secondly, the court found the distinction relevant to the achieve-
84. Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-31 (discussion of the development of the juvenile court
and the denial of procedural protections which are granted to adults).
85. Walker, 191 S.E.2d at 709.
86. Id. at 709-10. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that adults are self
sufficient, whereas juveniles are in need of supervision and control because they
are unable to protect themselves. Id. at 709. Besides this difference the Walker
court fails to list the "many valid distinctions" between adults and children that al-
low for the strikingly different approaches to noncriminal behavior.
87. Id. at 710. The Walker court also noted that juvenile acts in other states
have upheld as constitutional the classification and treatment of juveniles as differ-
ent than adults. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United Statem" The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 167.
88. Walker, 191 S.E.2d. at 710. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(8)(1989). Scope
of entitlement:
(a) An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in the follow-
ing actions and proceedings:
(8) In the case of a juvenile, a hearing as a result of which com-
mitment to an institution or transfer to the superior court for trial on
a felony charge is possible.
Id.
89. Walker, 191 S.E.2d at 710 (citing to McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
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ment of the state's objective because "the one needs protection
while the other needs correction." 9
Gault held that delinquents cannot be denied procedural due
process because in reality they are not merely being treated and
protected, but are also subject to punishment and incarceration.
This reasoning applies with equal force to status offenders and jus-
tifies their receiving the same procedural protections. As Gault
noted, it is possible a court could commit a child to an institution
and restrain his or her liberty for years.91 Thus the Supreme
Court determined, "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care
implied in the phrase 'due process'," for "[u]nder our Constitution,
the condition of being a [child] does not justify a kangaroo
court."92 An adjudication of a status offense can result in any
number of dispositions that restrain the child's liberty, including a
group home, foster home, forestry camp or a non-secure institu-
tion.93 Moreover, since a status offense can effect an adult adjudi-
cation as in Unger, as well as be used to sentence a child to secure
confinement, the label "status offender" should not justify a "kan-
garoo court." Status offenders, no less than delinquents, deserve
the protection of procedural regularity.
II. Effects of the Adjudication
A. Climbing up the Juvenile Court Ladder
Once a status offender has entered the juvenile court system
it is more likely that a court will find the child guilty as a "delin-
quent" if the problem behavior does not change. If the court finds
the child is a delinquent, the court can then impose a more serious
sentence.94 This can be accomplished either by violating a court
order or a contempt of court proceeding. National legislation origi-
nally discouraged turning a status offender into a delinquent for
committing the same non-criminal misbehavior twice and many
states have followed these recommendations. Unfortuantely, later
(1961), that a "statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it.") McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426.
90. Walker, 191 S.E.2d at 710.
91. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-8.
92. Id.
93. Cf., Barry C. Feld, supra note 31 (in Minnesota where institutionalization of
status offenders is no longer authorized, 3.5 percent of status offenders are still in-
carcerated in state or county institutions).
94. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 260.191 (Dispositions; Children who are in Need of
Protection and Services or Neglected and in foster care) and 260.185 (Dispositions;
Delinquent Child) (1990).
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amendments allowed institutionalization of status offenders for
"court order" violations.95
A majority of status offenders are habitual runaways, a cate-
gory that presents unique problems for the courts in handling and
protecting these repeat offenders.96 A controversial judicial ap-
proach which has developed to deal with repeat offenders is "boot-
strapping." Bootstrapping is the label given to the practice of
reclassifying a status offender as a delinquent for violating a court
supervision order.9 7 A new adjudication of delinquency opens the
door for courts to sentence these children with more serious
dispositions.
The United States Juvenile Justice Prevention and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974 (Act) discouraged bootstrapping
and encouraged similar treatment for initial status offenders and
reoffenders. 98 In particular, the Act denied states federal funding
for their juvenile court system, if they continued to detain status
offenders in secure facilities.99 Due to these national policy re-
forms, many states made statutory changes concerning how to deal
95. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
96. See, Richard E. Boehm, Legislative Response to In re Ronald S.: Cal. A.B.
958, 5 PEPP. L. REv. 847, 850 (1978) (quoting In re Ronald S., 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 391
(App. 1977).
97. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 68.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-778 (1974); Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223(a) 88 Stat. 1109, 1119.
SEC. 223 (a): In order to receive formula grants under this part a State
shall submit a plan... such plan must:
(12) provide within two years after submission of the plan that
juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult, shall not be placed in
juvenile detention or correctional facilities, but must be placed in shel-
ter facilities.
99. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5603(a)(12)(A) (1983).
(12) [Ihe term "secure detention facility" means any public or private
residential facility which-
(A) includes construction fixtures designed to physically restrict
the movements and activities of juveniles or other individuals held in
lawful custody in such facility; and
(B) is used for the temporary placement of any juvenile who is ac-
cused of having committed an offense, of any nonoffender, or of any
other individual accused of having committed a criminal offense.
42 U.S.C. § 5603(12)(A)-(B).
(13) Mhe term "secure correctional facility" means any public or pri-
vate residential facility which-
(A) includes construction fixtures designed to physically restrict
the movements and activities of juveniles or other individuals held in
lawful custody in such facility; and
(B) is used for the placement, after adjudication and disposition,
of any juvenile who has been adjudicated as having committed an of-
fense, any nonoffender, or any other individual convicted of a criminal
offense. 42 U.S.C. § 5603(13)(A), (B).
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with status reoffenders. 0 0
Several states, however, continued bootstrapping status of-
fenders despite the Act's recommendations.' 0 ' One particularly
striking case is that of KKB. v. State of Texas.l0 2 K.K.B. was a
runaway and adjudicated "a child in need of supervision" under
Texas law. She was placed in a foster home, and ordered to obey
all the foster family's instructions. Three weeks after her place-
ment, her foster mother returned her to a county unit of the De-
partment of Human Resources, and the unit then filed a
delinquency petition alleging her as a delinquent. The foster par-
ent testified that she refused to do her homework and had become
unhappy and uncooperative. The trial court, basing their decision
solely on her refusal to do homework, found K.K.B. delinquent
and committed her to the Texas Youth Council.103 This bootstrap-
ping was upheld by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, as it has
been in other states.O4
Other states oppose bootstrapping and follow the recommen-
dations of the 1974 Act.105 In re Ronald,9 an often cited California
juvenile court case, strongly criticized the practice of bootstrapping
characterizing it as a "vicious practice."' 06 An earlier California
statute allowed a non-criminal offender to be classified as a crimi-
100. Evelyn C. Knauerhase, The Federal Circle Game: The Precarious Constitu-
tional Status of Status Offenders, 7 CooLEY L. REV. 31 (1990). This article discusses
the effect of statutes which prevented the secure detention of status offenders, find-
ing that these children were then placed in mental health facilities by their par-
ents. This practice of "transinstitutionalization" is made possible by the Supreme
Court decision of Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham held that a parent
may admit a child to an inpatient mental facility and this admission will be consid-
ered voluntary and the child is not entitled to a hearing, even if the child objects to
the placement. Id. at 602-608. See, e.g., Ira M. Schwartz (IN) JUSTICE FOR
JUVENILES 131-148 (1989) (discussion of commitment of status offenders to inpatient
psychiatric and chemical dependency units of hospitals); Ira M. Schwartz, The "Hid-
den" System of Juvenile Control, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1984) (study done in
Minnesota finding that the deinstitutionalization of status offenders resulted in in-
creased numbers of youths being institutionalized in chemical dependency and
mental health systems).
101. John L. Hutzler, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over Children's Conduct 1982
Comparative Analysis of Juvenile & Family Codes and National Standards, 1982
NAT'L CTR. Juv. JUST. 1, 20-21. Hutzler found that status offenders who violated
court orders may be adjudicated delinquent under state statutes in Colorado, Flor-
ida, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas.
102. 609 S.W. 2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
103. Id. at 825.
104. Id. at 826; See also Rubin, supra note 9, at 68.
105. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. 1978); In re Bellanger, 357
So.2d 634 (La. 1978); In re M.S., E.O., D.K., E.M., 374 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1977); In re
Jones, 297 S.E.2d 168, (N.C. 1982); In re Darlene C., 301 S.E.2d 136 (S.C. 1983). See
also, Hutzler, supra note 2 at 20-21.
106. 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 391 (App. 3rd 1977).
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nal offender if the juvenile failed to obey a lawful order of the ju-
venile court.'0 7 Therefore, simply by walking out of a foster home
a runaway child could become a criminal offender and sentenced
to the California Youth Authority, although commitment to the
Youth Authority was not allowed for non-criminal offenders.108
To curb the inequity facing status offenders, the California Legis-
lature enacted the 1976 Amendments to the California Welfare
and Institutions Code, which provided that a non-criminal offender
cannot become a criminal offender simply by violating an order of
the court. 0 9  Unfortunately, as Ronald's case reveals, juvenile
107. Id, at 391. In California, the juvenile court is divided into three parts. The
Welfare and Institutions Code is divided into §§ 600, 601, and 602. Section 600 cov-
ered the dependent children which includes victims of abuse and neglect. However,
section 600 currently falls under the 300 category. Section 602 covers children who
violate the law. The acts they commit would be crimes if committed by an adult.
The § 601's are noncriminal offenders who fall in between these two categories, and
according to the Ronald opinion have "always been a major headache to the juve-
nile court." Id. at 389. As Justice Gardner explains the 601 category originally in-
cluded behavior even "the most straight-laced individual would have difficulty
defining as sinful." Id at 390. Behaviors previously included under 601 were:
1. The incorrigible. An incorrigible is defined as a minor who per-
sistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper or-
ders and directions of a parent or guardian or who is beyond the
control of that parent or guardian.
2. The truant.
3. The curfew violator.
4. One who for cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd or immoral life.
Id. Currently § 601 includes:
(a) Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitu-
ally refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of
his parent, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the control of such
person, or who is under the age of 18 years when he violated any ordi-
nance of any city or county of this state establishing a curfew based
solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1984).
In Justice Gardner's criticisms of the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over
601's, he states:
The 601 was a judicial nightmare. He resented being in court. He
had violated no law. He usually did not get along with his parents and,
when one met the parents, this was often understandable. He was
often severely maladjusted presenting bleak hope of effective treat-
ment. Just as often he was a time-consuming minor nuisance some in-
adequate parent was trying to fob off on the court.
Justice Gardner also criticizes the intermingling of 601's and 602's in the same insti-
tutions. He states "the youngster whose only offense against society was that he
could not get along with his parents, found himself cheek by jowl with the under-
age rapist, robber or heroin peddler." Id.
108. The California Youth Authority is a state department developed to oversee
California's youth and juvenile corrections programs. Pearl S. West, The California
Youth Authority, 607 PEPP. L. REv. 607 (1979). Commitment to the authority is
governed by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1984).
109. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984); 138 CAL. RPTR. 387, 391.
Law and Inequality
court judges attempted to circumvent this legislative change. Af-
ter Ronald was adjudicated a non-criminal offender the court or-
dered him to remain at the juvenile crisis center. When Ronald
left the crisis center without permission, a petition under a crimi-
nal offender status was filed for a criminal contempt of court vio-
lation under Penal Code Section 166(4). Since contempt of court
was a criminal offense he was deemed a criminal offender and
could be incarcerated as a delinquent. Contempt of court provided
an alternative means for the court to bootstrap a juvenile non-
criminal offender into a criminal delinquent. As Justice Gardner
points out, the court was "doing by indirection what cannot be
done directly." i o Therefore, Justice Gardner and the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals ruled that a status offender who runs away
may be neither adjudicated a law violator nor placed in secure
detention."'
In addition to turning a status offender into a delinquent for
violating a court order, courts use other means to indirectly boot-
strap juvenile offenders. One example of an indirect route to adju-
dication of delinquency is through the crime of "escape." In New
Jersey, four children adjudicated "juveniles in need of supervi-
sion" were placed in shelter care facilities and subsequently classi-
fied by the trial judge as delinquents for committing the crime of
escape when they left these facilities."i 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this practice. The
court held that "[t]he unauthorized leaving of a shelter is sympto-
matic of the very problem for which shelter care is being pro-
vided.113 Furthermore, "[iut would be incongruous to classify a
110. 138 CAL RPTR. at 392.
111. I& at 387-88. Justice Gardner states "while it may seem ridiculous to place
a runaway in a nonsecure setting, nevertheless, that is what the Legislature has or-
dained." Id. at 392.
112. In re M.S., E.O., D.K., and E.M., 374 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1977). The Appellate Di-
vision upheld the adjudications of delinquency based on criminal escape. I& at 446.
113. Id. at 448.
The New Jersey Juvenile Act defined "juvenile in need of supervision" to
mean:
a. A juvenile who is habitually disobedient to his parent or guardian;
b. A juvenile who is ungovernable or incorrigible;
c. A juvenile who is habitually and voluntarily truant from school; or
d. A juvenile who has committed an offense or violation of a statute or
ordinance applicable only to juveniles. Evidence of conduct which is




(3) knowingly visiting gambling places, or patronizing other places
or establishments, the juvenile's admission to which constitutes
a violation of law,
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juvenile as a delinquent for the same kind of conduct which under
the Act constitutes him or her as being in need of supervision
only."114 The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that a child
who runs away from a shelter is only harming his or her own well
being; by contrast the court believed the crime of escape "offends
social order and the rule of law."115 Therefore, the court found
the juvenile should not be subject to the stigma of delinquency
when she has not committed a crime against society.116 This is a
positive result recognizing that a child who has not committed a
criminal act should not be wrongly treated as a criminal.
In general, state courts have responded to national criticism
of bootstrapping juveniles by ruling that juveniles may not become
delinquents by running away or disobeying their court orders.117
Unfortunately, these same courts have found ways to bypass the
bootstrapping limitations and have instead relied on judicial con-
tempt powers to serve status offenders with stiffer penalties.118 In
effect, the court can turn a chronic status offender into a contem-
nor but not a delinquent. The contemnor may then receive a sen-
tence of secure detention.
B. Contempt of Court as a Default
Most courts have found that imposing a more severe sentence
(4) habitual idle roaming of the streets at night,
(5) deportment which endangers the juvenile's own morals, health
or general welfare.
Id. at 446 n.3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-45 (West 1987).
As used in this act, 'delinquency' means the commission of an act by a juvenile
which if committed by an adult would constitute:
a. A homicide or act of treason;
b. A high misdemeanor or misdemeanor,
c. A disorderly persons offense; or
d. A violation of any other penal statute, ordinance or regulation.
I& at 446 n.2.
Current New Jersey Statutory law changed the label of child in need of super-
vision to that of "juvenile family crisis". See, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-22,23 (West
1987).
114. 374 A.2d at 448.
115. Id.
116. Id., citing to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
117. See, e.g., In re Toni Carole Baker, a minor, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. 1978)
(under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act a juvenile runaway adjudged in need of su-
pervision can not be adjudicated delinquent for violating the court's order); In re
Doris Louise Jones, 297 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that noncriminal
activities which violated a court order of an undisciplined child could not be used
for adjudication of that child as a delinquent); In re Darlene C., 301 S.E.2d 136 (S.C.
1983) (Family Court could punish juvenile who committed criminal contempt by
running away in violation of court order under its inherent contempt power; how-
ever the court could not adjudicate as delinquent a chronic status offender).
118. Kim Brooks, supra note 2 at 17-21.
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on a status offender for violating her court orders is a valid use of
the courts' contempt power. State courts, however, have placed
different restrictions on this power.119 Morever, national legisla-
tion has affirmed the use of the contempt power as a means to in-
carcerate repeat status offenders.120
There is considerable conflict over the use of contempt of
court when a child has committed the same non-criminal behavior
twice, resulting in inconsistent and unique state solutions. One of
the first cases to deal with the issue is L.A.M. v. State.'21 In this
decision, the Alaska Supreme Court held that before holding a ju-
venile in criminal contempt four elements must be established: (1)
there must be a valid court order directing the alleged contemnor
to do or refrain from doing something and the court's jurisdiction
to enter that order; (2) the contemnor must have sufficient notice
of the court order; (3) the contemnor must be able to comply with
the order; and (4) there must be a wilful failure to comply with
the order.122 After establishing these elements, a child may then
be placed in a secure facility for contempt of court.
The L.A.M. court relied upon the parens patriae doctrine to
justify the juvenile court judges' use of the contempt power in
these non-criminal cases.123 The court rejected L.A.M.'s argument
that running away only harmed herself and that consequently the
state should not interfere with her liberty interest. The court held
that in addition to the child's liberty interest the parents' and
state's interests also must be considered.124 The state's interest in
"protecting children from venereal disease, from exposure to the
use of dangerous and illicit drugs, from attempted rape, and from
119. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
120. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-509, § ll(a)(13)(A), 94
Stat. 2750, 2757 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1982)).
121. 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
122. Id. at 831.
123. Id But see, Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977). Calendine
held that status offenders must be treated consistently with the parens patriae doc-
trine, meaning they must be helped and not punished. Due to the need to treat and
rehabilitate the court held that there was no rational justification for attempting to
accomplish these goals through placing children in secure facilities. Id. at 326. Fur-
thermore, the court specifically held that:
[Flor those extreme cases in which commitment of status offend-
ers to a secure, prison-like extreme cases cannot be avoided, the re-
ceiving facility must be devoted solely to the custody and
rehabilitation of status offenders. In this manner status offenders can
be spared contact under degrading and harmful conditions with delin-
quents who are guilty of criminal conduct and experienced in the ways
of crime.
Id at 329.
124. 547 P.2d at 832.
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physical injury" justifies a more severe penalty. 2 5
Although contemnors are only committing behavior that
under statutory law warrants non-secure dispositions, courts have
ignored legislative intent' 26 and sentenced children to dispositions
normally unavailable to a non-criminal offender. L.A.M. argued
that because her conduct of running away had not changed, the
new sanction of being placed in a locked setting was inappropri-
ate.127 The court, however, believed the McLaughlin Training
School where L.A.M. was sent was different from a maximum se-
curity institution, since Alaska sent its most serious juvenile of-
fenders to secure institutions in other states.128 The court believed
chronic runaways such as L.A.M. would be no different then the
rest of the population at McLaughlin. As a result, the Alaska
Supreme Court found the sanction was not unreasonably onerous
and a court should be allowed to use its inherent contempt powers
to enforce orders.129
Consistent with the rationale of L.A.M. but adding more re-
strictions on the contempt power, is the oft cited case of Hammer-
gren.130 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "only under the
most egregious of circumstances" may the juvenile courts exercise
their contempt power in such a manner that a status offender will
be incarcerated in a secure facility.131 In addition, the record must
125. Id. at 834. The court admits it will never be completely successful in pro-
tecting its young people but it has the obligation to try. Id. But see, David L.
Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 42, 44 (1970).
When the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
addressed a convention of juvenile court judges he explained:
The situation is truly ironic. The argument for retaining beyond
control and truancy jurisdiction is that juvenile courts have to act in
such cases because 'if we don't act, no one else will.' I submit that pre-
cisely the opposite is the case: because you act, no one else does.
Schools and public agencies refer their problem cases to you because
you have jurisdiction, because you exercise it, and because you hold
out promises that you can provide solutions (emphasis added).
126. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
127. 547 P.2d at 834.
128. Id. The LAM. court explains that in Colorado, California, Illinois, and New
York children in need of supervision (CINS) can be placed in juvenile halls or
youth centers, which are buildings with locked doors, but these CINS cannot be
placed in state training schools which are in actuality maximum security institu-
tions Id. at 835 (citing In re Presley, 264 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 1970); In re Tomasita N.,
287 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1972); C. v. Redlich, 300 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1973)). The court
then determined that the McLaughlin Youth Center is more analogous to a juve-
nile hall then a maximum security institution and therefore L.A.M. and other
CINS may be placed there. The court bases the decision on the fact that Alaska
sends delinquents who have committed very serious crimes to state training schools
in Colorado or California rather than McLaughlin. Id.
129. Id. at 835-36.
130. 294 N.W. 705 (Minn. 1980).
131. Id. at 707.
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detail that all less restrictive alternatives failed in the past. 3 2
The Hammergren holding is openly at odds with a Minnesota
statutory law, which states that wayward children who violate
their court orders shall be placed in shelter care facilities only.' 33
The Hammergren court recognized that the statute had been
amended from a previous provision which allowed repeatedly way-
ward children to be placed in secure rather than shelter care facili-
ties. The reasons for the amendment included the potential
negative effects on status offenders detained with children who
have committed crimes.134 Similarly, the court admitted that "the
Legislature may well have determined that removing status of-
fenders from facilities designed for and used for law violators
would result in better treatment, better programs, and better serv-
ices for the child and that child's family."135 Despite the court's
recognition of the statutory changes, which brought Minnesota
into compliance with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention Act of 1974, the court nonetheless held that status offend-
ers may be incarcerated.' 36
The implications of Hammergren are significant considering
the court rejects the plain language of the statute prohibiting se-
cure confinement of repeat status offenders, while still acknowl-
edging many valid reasons to forbid the incarceration of status
offenders. The Hammergren ruling remains in force today, and
many other states that have dealt with the same or similar issues
have adopted its analysis.137
132. Id. at 708.
133. Id. at 708 (Wahl, J. concurring). The previous statute stated that "a child
taken into custody by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient who had
previously escaped from a shelter care facility might be placed in a secure facility."
MINN. STAT. § 260.173 (1976). MINN. STAT. § 260.173, subd. 3 (b) (1978) states:
Having been previously adjudicated delinquent, or.. . condition-
ally released by the juvenile court without adjudication, has violated
his probation, parole, or other field supervision under which the child
had been placed as a result of behavior described in this subdivision;
the child may be placed only in a shelter care facility.
Other pertinent definitions include:
Secure detention facility means a physically restricting detention
facility, including a detention home.
Shelter care facility means a physically unrestricting facility, such
as a group home or a licensed facility for foster care, excluding a de-
tention home.
MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd.16, subd. 17 (1978).
134. 294 N.W.2d 705, 707. The Hammergren court also noted that the ABA Ju-
venile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misconduct,
concluded that wayward youth are best served outside the juvenile court system.
Id.
135. Id. at 707.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., In re Michael G., 747 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1988) (adopts similar qualifica-
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The use of a court's "inherent contempt powers" or an adju-
dication of delinquency against a repeat status offender can both
result in the juveniles secure confinement. Despite the same con-
sequences, many courts will not allow a repeat offender to become
a delinquent but will allow the incarceration of a contemnor.138 In
In re Michael G., the Supreme Court of California found that the
In re Ronald S. holding139 which prohibited detention of contemp-
tuous status offenders based on an elevation to delinquency status,
did not address whether contemptuous status offenders could be
placed in secure facilities without converting the youth to the
criminal offender delinquent status.140 In resolving this question,
the Michael G. court determined that without express legislation
prohibiting the use of judicial contempt powers, the power is too
fundamental to be eliminated.141 Although the contempt power
was not expressly limited, the court did recognize that the legisla-
ture's general intent was to deinstitutionalize status offenders.
Therefore, the California Supreme Court used a restrictive test for
exercising contempt powers and incarcerating a juvenile non-crim-
inal offender.142 The limitations imposed were borrowed from the
tions as Hammergren); In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991) (despite a legislative
ban a court can still use the contempt power to incarcerate status offenders); In re
G.B., 430 N.E.2d 1096 (Ill. 1981); In re Ann. M., 525 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1987) (power to
punish for contempt does not depend on legislative grant); In re Darlene C., 301
S.E.2d 136, 137 (S.C. 1983) (adopts the egregious standard); State v. Norlund, 644
P.2d 724, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ("[o]nly under the most egregious circumstances
should the juvenile court exercise its contempt power to incarcerate a status of-
fender in a secure facility"); In re D.L.D., 327 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Wis. 1983) (Allowing
incarceration of the status offender when the contemptuous act is egregious and
less restrictive alternatives have failed or would fail). But see, W.M. v. State, 437
N.E.2d 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (contempt power can not be used in contravention
of legislation... "[any change must come from the Legislature").
138. See, e.g., In re Baker, 376 N.E. 2d 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1978). "Juvenile contem-
nor, civil or criminal, may be punished for their contumacy, but the court clearly
cannot use a contempt finding as a basis for an adjudication of delinquency under
the valid and unambiguous terms of the Juvenile Court Act."; In re Darlene C., 301
S.E.2d 136, 138 (S.C. 1983). The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that a
chronic status offender can not be sentenced as a delinquent but remanded the case
so the juvenile runaway could be punished in a secure detention facility under the
court's inherent contempt powers.
139. In re Ronald S., 138 Cal Rptr. 387.
140. In re Michael G., 747 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1988).
141. 747 P.2d at 1156-59.
142. Id. at 1160-63. In justifying their departure from the legislature the court
states:
Thus, although the legislature's general prohibition on the secure
detention during nonschool hours for section 601 wards does not apply
to contemnors, respect for the intent of our co-equal branch of govern-
ment demands that courts exercise caution when imposing such sanc-
tions against contemptuous status offenders.
Id, at 1160.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion In re of D.LD.143 Following
the reasoning of the D.L.D. decision, the Michael G. court believed
these restrictions would balance the legislature's intentions of
deinstitutionalization with the inherent contempt powers of the
court.144
Express legislative provisions denying secure detention as a
possibility for non-criminal offenders in contempt of court have
also been repudiated. In re Michael G. did not answer the consti-
tutional question of whether the legislature could override the in-
herent contempt power of the courts.145 However, a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a legislative
amendment prohibiting courts from using contempt of court to in-
carcerate truants was unconstitutional.146 The J.E.S. court relied
on the separation of powers doctrine finding that a legislature may
provide reasonable regulations as to the procedures observed in ex-
ercising the contempt power but cannot divest courts of the power
altogether.147
J.E.S. argued that the legislative amendment was a reason-
able regulation of the contempt power because the court could still
impose other sanctions such as community service on children who
disobeyed a court order to attend school. 1 4 s The court disagreed
holding that "by prohibiting courts from incarcerating juveniles
who repeatedly act in contempt of a court order, the amended sec-
tion unreasonably limits the courts' inherent contempt power."149
The court further supported its decision by stating its belief that
143. 327 N.W.2d 682. These limitations include:
(1) the juvenile is given sufficient notice to comply with the order and
understands its provisions; (2) the violation of the court order is egre-
gious; (3) less restrictive alternatives were considered and found to be
ineffective; (4) special confinement conditions are arranged consistent
with § 48.209 (no intermingling with delinquents).
144. 747 P.2d 1152, 1159-60.
145. 747 P.2d at 1160.
146. In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991).
147. This same separation of powers argument was used successfully in In re
G.B. to ignore legislative intentions. 430 N.E.2d 1096 (Ill. 1981). An interesting as-
pect of the In re G.B. case is the dissents' criticism of the circumvention of the leg-
islature's attempts to develop sentencing schemes, and the unjust outcome of the
decision. Justice Simon writes:
Sentencing a 16-year old boy to 60 days in a detention center for con-
tempt of court because he refused to attend school is in my judgment a
circumvention of the statutory policy of this State. I also believe it is
harsh to the point of being an abuse of discretion and that confine-
ment for that length of time in a detention center is likely to do the
minor as well as society more harm than good.
430 N.E.2d at 1101.
148. 817 P.2d at 510-11.
149. Id at 513.
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the threat of incarceration is what makes other truancy sanctions
effective. The court also cited language from other decisions
which stand for the proposition that without the contempt power
courts are meaningless. 15o
Although state courts have reached strikingly different re-
sults concerning the use of the contempt power to incarcerate re-
peat status offenders, Congress did step in and permit the secure
detention of these children.'51 The 1980 Amendments to the Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (Amendments) re-
ceived considerable opposition, but the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges strongly urged recognition of
this inherent power of the court.152 The Amendment's purpose
was to aid courts in responding to "youth who chronically refuse
voluntary treatment."153 Before forcing this "treatment" on the
child with secure detention, Congress established restrictions simi-
lar to those found in the Hammergren and Michael G. opinions.154
The juvenile must be adjudicated a status offender subject to a
court order, and given fair warning of the consequences of violat-
ing the court order.155 However, the "proper procedures" a court
must follow in establishing the court order are not defined. Due to
150. Id. (citing In re Ronald S., which discusses the problems courts have with
runaway status offenders). J.E.S. quotes the Ronald S. statement that "[i]f the ju-
venile court is to be saddled with the responsibility of [status offenders], it must
also be afforded the tools and authorities to handle these cases." 138 Cal. Rptr. 387,
392-93 (1978).
151. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-509, § 11(a)(13)(A), 94
Stat. 2750, 2757 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1982)).
Under § 5433, the requirements for funding now provide:
12(A) provide within three years after submission of the initial plan
that juveniles who are charged with or have committed offenses that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult or offenses which do
not constitute violations of valid court orders, or such nonoffenders as
dependent or neglected children, shall not be placed in secure deten-
tion facilities or secure correctional facilities (emphasis added).
Besides the many different decisions denying or allowing for incarceration
through contempt of court, the uniqueness of state solutions is apparent in states
that have tried to meet some middle ground. See, e.g., Julia S., 719 P.2d 449, 454,
104 N.M. 222, 227 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (Children in Need of Supervision (CHINS)
can only be incarcerated if they violate their probation terms three times. Even
then the incarceration cannot exceed ten days).
152. See Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offend-
ers: Attempts to Circumvent The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
16 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 41, 55 n.63 (1981). See also, SCHWARTz, supra note 89 at
89-97.
153. 126 CONG.REc. H10,932 -38 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980).
154. Michael G., 747 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Cal. 1988); L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294
N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1980).
155. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(iii)(3)(i-iii) (1989).
(3) For the purpose of determining whether a valid court order exists
and a juvenile has been found to be in violation of that valid order all
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the narrow holding of Gault and In re Winship and the insuffi-
cient representation status offenders receive, it is unlikely the ju-
venile will have received adequate legal counsel, and thus have no
advocate for other "proper" procedural protections.
Despite the Congressional changes allowing for the incarcera-
tion of status offenders in contempt of court proceedings, a minor-
ity of states have held that incarcerating a repeat status offender
for contempt of court circumvents the intent of the states' legisla-
ture.156 In 1978, the North Carolina legislature removed a viola-
tion of probation from the definition of a delinquent child.157
Construing this statutory change, the North Carolina Supreme
Court determined that the legislative purpose behind this amend-
ment would be frustrated if courts used contempt of court to incar-
cerate probation violators.158
Congressional legislation and the majority of contempt cases
allow a status offender to be incarcerated for committing non-
criminal behavior twice. These cases reveal that jurisdiction over
status offenders does not meet its goal of rehabilitation and treat-
ment. Therefore, the justifications for denying non-criminal of-
of the following conditions must be present prior to secure incarcera-
tion:
(i) The juvenile must have been brought into a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and made subject to an order issued pursuant to
proper authority. The order must be one which regulates future con-
duct of the juvenile.
(ii) The court must have entered a judgment and/or remedy in ac-
cord with established legal principles based on the facts after a hearing
which observes proper procedures.
(iii) The juvenile in question must have received adequate and
fair warning of the consequences of violation of the order at the time
it was issued and such warning must be provided to the juvenile and to
the juvenile's attorney and/or legal guardian in writing and be re-
flected in the court record and proceedings.
156. Kim Brooks, supra note 2 at 19 (Indiana, Louisiana, West Virginia, and
Pennsylvania have adopted this position).
157. G.S. 7A-517(12). The statute currently is as follows:
Delinquent Juvenile.-Any juvenile less than 16 years of age who
has committed a criminal offense under State law or under an ordi-
nance of local government, including violations of the motor vehicle
laws.
The provision which allowed an undisciplined child to become a delinquent by
violating her probation without committing a crime was deleted from the statute
effective 1 July 1978.
158. In re Doris Louise Jones, 297 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. 1982). Fifteen year old, Doris
Jones was ordered "to attend school every day, to be at her grandmother's home by
8:00 p.m. on weeknights and 11:00 p.m. on weekends and to notify her grandmother
where she is at all times." I& at 168. When she violated the trial court's order she
was committed to a secure facility for thirty days. See also, In re Bellanger, 357
So.2d 634 (La. 1978) (truant could not be found delinquent and commitment to De-
partment of Corrections for violating probation).
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fenders the same procedural protections provided juvenile
delinquents are flawed.
III. Addressing the Consequences
When the Supreme Court handed down Gault in 1967, the
Court recognized that the rationale of acting in the child's best in-
terest without regard to procedural protections was no longer real-
istic. Children were not being treated and rehabilitated but rather
punished and confined in institutions very similar to those serving
adults.159 Despite Gault, the treatment and rehabilitation ratio-
nales continue to deny universal application of procedural due pro-
cess rights to non-criminal juvenile offenders. A more thorough
examination of the juvenile justice system reveals that status of-
fenders, like delinquents, deserve the full protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Despite many recommendations to remove status offenders
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court altogether, jurisdiction
over this group persists, and far too often the system falls short of
its goal of serving the child's "best interests."16 0 Of particular con-
cern is that legislative restrictions on secure detention have been
undermined.1 6i As discussed, juvenile courts have found ways to
159. Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-27. See also, In re Ellery C., 300 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1973)
(confining a PINS with juvenile delinquents in a training school can not serve as
treatment or supervision, rather "it may well result in [the child's] emerging well
tutored in the ways of crime.") Id.
160. See Feld, supra note 14 at 162 n. 73 (nearly every professional group which
has considered status jurisdiction has recommended its elimination from the juve-
nile court). For a concise look at the arguments for and against the repeal of status
offense jurisdiction see Rubin, supra note 9, at 62-65. See also Board of Directors,
National Counsel on Crime and Delinquency, Jurisdiction over Status offenses
Should be Removed from the Juvenile CourL A Policy Statement, 21 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 97 (1975); Orman W. Ketchman, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders
Should Be Eliminated From Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U.L. REV. 645 (1977); Ira M.
Schwartz (IN) JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 50-51 (1989). Cf Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 223(a) (12), 88 Stat. 1109, 1121
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5701 (1988).
The Congress hereby finds that-
(4) the problem of locating, detaining, and returning runaway children
should not be the responsibility of already overburdened police depart-
ments and juvenile justice authorities; and
(5) in view of the interstate nature of the problem, it is the responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to develop accurate reporting of the
problem nationally and to develop an effective system of temporary
care outside the law enforcement structure.
But see, Lindsay G. Arthur, Status Offenders Need A Court of Last Resort, 57
B.U.L. REV. 631 (1977); Charles H. Logan & Sharla P. Rausch, Why Deinstitution-
alizing Status Offenders Is Pointless, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 501 (1985).
161. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act (JJDPA), 42 U.S.C. § 5601-5640
(1983), as amended by Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94
Stat 2750.
Law and Inequality
ignore these reforms and place non-criminal offenders in institu-
tions. Most strikingly, the national legislation condoning contempt
of court as a basis for incarceration results in children receiving se-
vere sentences. Allowing secure confinement reveals the unfortu-
nate reality that these juveniles are not simply receiving
rehabilitation and treatment but punishment. Finally, status adju-
dications can ultimately effect a later adult sentence as in Unger,
further illustrating the unfairness of current judicial and legisla-
tive approaches to status offenders.
State legislatures should clearly provide the right of repre-
sentation to status offenders. Furthermore, this right must in
practice be realized. The juvenile courts should make it
mandatory that any child facing the possibility of home removal or
commitment to a secure or non-secure institution receive counsel.
Once counsel is provided to these children, no child could be re-
moved from his home under the facade of treatment without fair
representation. Furthermore, increased representation will allow
the case law to more fully develop with increased judicial decision
making. With the efforts of both state legislatures and the judici-
ary in giving these children specific attention and heightened pro-
cedural rights, they can no longer be channeled through the
juvenile court system in such a discretionary manner.
Finally, since status offenders are the final group of children
suffering from the "worst of both worlds," they deserve the same
procedural protections afforded juvenile delinquents. The differ-
ences in the treatment of status offenders and delinquents is in re-
ality negligible, since a status offender can easily become a
delinquent simply by engaging in non-criminal behavior twice.
The Supreme Court in Gault held "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."162 As long
as status offenders continue to be at the mercy of a capricious and
unaccountable juvenile justice system, the promise of procedural
protections for everyone remains unfulfilled.
162. 387 U.S. at 13.
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